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Abstract: Cases of grounding failure present a puzzle for fundamental metaphysics. Typically,
solutions are thought to lie either in adding ontology such as haecceities or in re-describing the
cases by means of the ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy. The controversial status of
haecceities has led some to favour metaphysical indeterminacy as the way to solve the puzzle. We
consider two further treatments of grounding failure each of which, we argue, is a more plausible
alternative. As such, the initial dichotomy is a false one, and these alternative options deserve con-
sideration before resorting to the heavyweight machinery of metaphysical indeterminacy.
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1. Introduction
INDETERMINACY IS UBIQUITOUS. It is widely thought that our language contains
vague expressions which indeterminately represent things. Some philosophers,
though, have suggested that there is another kind of indeterminacy – metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy – which lies in how things are, rather than in how they are rep-
resented or what we know about them. Metaphysical indeterminacy, thus, is not a
matter of the relations between our representations and the world; the world itself
is indeterminate, somehow. This idea of “ontic unsettlement” is familiar from var-
ious discussions, for instance, about the future, personal identity, the continuum
hypothesis, and subatomic reality.
All the same, metaphysical indeterminacy has been regarded as unintelligible
and/or as problematically requiring non-classical logics (see, e.g., Dummett,
1975; Williamson, 1994, ch. 9). Yet a number of philosophers have in recent
years attempted to revive metaphysical indeterminacy by proposing a framework
which renders it intelligible while maintaining both classical logic and classical
semantics (see Barnes and Williams, 2011). The intuitive idea is that when it is
metaphysically indeterminate as to whether A, determinately there are two exclu-
sive and exhaustive states of affairs: A and ¬A, but it is indeterminate which one
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obtains. For instance, assume with van Inwagen (1990) that simples compose a
further thing only when their activity constitutes a life. When Tristan is dying,
however, it is not determinate as to whether the joint activity of his atoms consti-
tutes a life and hence it is not determinate as to whether his atoms compose some
further thing: there is a state of affairs in which Tristan is undeniably alive, and
there is also a state of affairs in which Tristan is undeniably dead; but when Tris-
tan is dying, it is not determinate which one obtains.
This article takes no issue with the intelligibility of metaphysical indeterminacy,
nor with its compatibility with classical logic. The point of focus is rather on a par-
ticular motivation for metaphysical indeterminacy as a response to failures of the
grounding relation. This line of thought takes the framework of metaphysical inde-
terminacy to best explain the appearance of the existence of puzzling cases in
which there are facts which can be seen neither to be grounded in fundamental
facts nor to themselves be fundamental. As a result, in such cases, grounding fails.
We shall argue why this line of thought fails. In section 2, we characterize two
familiar ways of responding to grounding failure: either by adding a special ontol-
ogy of haecceities which provide grounds in the problem cases, or by accepting an
ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy that re-describes the cases. In the following
sections, we aim to undermine this dichotomous approach. In section 3, we show
that in some signiﬁcant cases of grounding failure there are ontological alternatives
to haecceities. And in section 4, we argue that even if an ideological response to
cases of grounding failure is sought, a more modest form of indeterminacy, referen-
tial indeterminacy, is preferable to the heavyweight metaphysical variety.
2. Grounding Failure and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Grounding, as we understand it here, is a primitive relation between facts. When a
fact B is grounded in a fact A, we say that B is less fundamental than A; equiva-
lently, B is a derivative fact, deriving as it does from A. The most fundamental facts
– or absolutely fundamental facts – are not grounded in further facts, whereas each
derivative fact is ultimately grounded in fundamental facts via a chain of grounds.
We call the sort of metaphysics corresponding to this picture of reality fundamental
metaphysics. It is against the backdrop of fundamental metaphysics that grounding
failure has been taken to motivate metaphysical indeterminacy.1
1 See, for example, Barnes (2014), who discusses cases of grounding failure in a framework of funda-
mental metaphysics. It should be noted, though, that our arguments in this article do not rest on funda-
mental metaphysics, that is, metaphysics in which there is an absolutely fundamental level. Instead, we
explore whether cases of grounding failure make serious trouble for fundamental metaphysics. It is an
important question, for another time, whether such cases also make trouble for relative, not absolute,
fundamentality.
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Cases of grounding failure are those puzzle cases in which a certain fact would
initially appear to be grounded in a certain way, and yet argument appears to
show that it is not so grounded after all – but nor does it appear to be the sort of
fact that should be regarded as fundamental.2 There are a number of such cases
in the literature. One widely discussed example has been formulated by Tim
Maudlin’s discussion of quantum entanglement in the philosophy of physics:
Suppose there are two electrons, well separated in space (perhaps at opposite ends of a laboratory),
that are in the Singlet State. If the principle of Separability held, then each electron, occupying a
region disjoint from the other, would have its own intrinsic spin state, and the spin state of the
composite system would be determined by the states of the particles taken individually, together
with the spatio-temporal relations between them. But … no pure state for a single particle yields
the same predictions as the Singlet State, and if one were to ascribe a pure state to each of the
electrons, their joint state would be a product state rather than an entangled state. The joint state of
the pair simply cannot be analyzed into pure states for each of the components. (Maudlin,
2007, p. 57)3
One would expect facts about the joint state of the electrons to be grounded in
something, and so not be fundamental. Most plausibly, we would expect facts
about the pair to be grounded in facts about “each of the components” in the
“pure state” of the particles taken individually. Yet Maudlin argues that because
Separability does not hold, the joint state of the pair is not grounded in the pure
states of each component – and nothing else appears to provide grounds for it,
either. As such, this qualiﬁes as a case of grounding failure.
Similarly, consider Max Black’s (1952) universe in which there are two qualita-
tively identical spheres, Castor and Pollux, two miles apart from each other.
Again, we would expect that facts about the two spheres are grounded in facts
about each, and are not fundamental. Yet one standard response to Black’s case is
to say that the fact that there are two qualitatively identical and yet numerically
distinct spheres is not grounded in more fundamental facts about Castor and Pol-
lux. Elizabeth Barnes (2014, p. 353) summarizes the point as follows:
[W]e might … describe Black’s world as another instance of grounding failure … Rather than a
world in which there are two things that differ haecceitistically, we can instead say that Black’s
world is one in which the global facts about how many things there are fails to be grounded in or
determined by individual identity facts.
2 Given our characterization, it would be useful to know what it is for a fact to appear as non-funda-
mental. Part of this, displayed by the examples we go on to consider, appears to lie in the complexity of
the facts. This indicates that there may be (at least) two notions of fundamentality at issue in debates in
fundamental metaphysics: fundamentality as groundlessness, and fundamentality as simplicity. Exploring
this is beyond the scope of the current article.
3 This passage is quoted from Barnes (2014, p. 350). See also Schaffer (2010, p. 53).
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Cases of grounding failure present a distinctive problem for fundamental meta-
physics. For this picture of metaphysics imposes a requirement that these cases
cannot emerge, since each fact is ultimately grounded in fundamental facts, but
the cases of grounding failure present facts that are not derived but not fundamen-
tal either.
There are broadly two ways for proponents of fundamental metaphysics to face
this challenge: add some ontology so as to ground the anomalous facts (the onto-
logical approach) or add some ideology so as to re-describe them (the ideological
approach). Focusing on the case of Black’s universe – as we will do for the rest of
this article – the ontological approach postulates haecceities: the numerical diversity
of the qualitatively identical spheres can be grounded in their haecceity properties,
where a natural candidate for the haecceity of an object a is the property of being
identical to a. Haecceities, however, are controversial: they would make our knowl-
edge of true identity statements mysterious. For in order to know a true identity
statement that a is identical to b, we should also have to know that a possesses the
same haecceity as b does. It is not at all clear, though, how we could come to know
such facts. In addition, haecceitism makes any account of identity and distinctness
trivial: every object a is numerically distinct from all other objects, simply in virtue
of its possessing the property of being identical to a.
It has been proposed that to avoid haecceities and explain grounding failure in
Black’s universe, an ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy should be intro-
duced. Barnes (2014, p. 353), who supports the ideological approach, has put the
point as follows:
If we have the resources of [metaphysical] indeterminacy, we can say that determinately there are
two things in the Black world, but that it’s indeterminate which thing is which. That is, it’s deter-
minate that we have two things – Castor and Pollux. But it’s indeterminate which thing is Castor,
and likewise indeterminate which thing is Pollux.
In the following two sections, we suggest that the choice between haecceities and
metaphysical indeterminacy is too restrictive a way of explaining grounding fail-
ure. On the ontology side, in section 3, we propose that facts about the numerical
diversity of the spheres can be grounded in qualitative relations, avoiding
haecceities altogether. And on the ideology side, in section 4, we propose that the
introduction of the framework of referential indeterminacy is preferable to the
doctrine of metaphysical indeterminacy.
3. Grounding by Relations
In this section, we defend and develop James Ladyman’s suggestion that in
Black’s universe (and similar cases), the numerical diversity of the spheres can be
© 2019 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiﬁelsen Theoria
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grounded in the symmetric and irreﬂexive relations they bear to each other: each
sphere is at a distance from the other, but it is at no distance from itself; and this
sufﬁces to ground the fact that there are two numerically distinct spheres. Since,
on this view, the numerical diversity of the spheres can be grounded in the rela-
tions they bear to each other, no appeal need be made to haecceities (see
Ladyman, 2007, 2016).4 Thus, we shall defend the thesis that the fact that the
spheres are two miles apart from each other (call it Distance) sufﬁces to ground
the fact that there are two numerically distinct spheres (call it Cardinality). But
how exactly can Cardinality be grounded in Distance?
The main thought is that positive distance relations are symmetric and irreﬂex-
ive. That is, if one sphere is two miles from the centre of another, the other sphere
is two miles from the centre of it, and no sphere is two miles from the centre of
itself. The fact that the spheres are two miles apart from each other explains or
grounds why there are two distinct spheres in Black’s universe.
However, according to an important line of argument against this mode of
grounding, the holding of an irreﬂexive relation between the spheres fails to gro-
und their distinctness, because it already presupposes the distinctness of its relata.
In general, the obtaining of an irreﬂexive relation requires that its relata are
numerically distinct – but if so, then how is the numerical distinctness of the
relata supposed to be grounded in the relation being irreﬂexive? Let us call this
the circularity objection (see, among others, Hawley, 2009).
Although it has been widely discussed, the circularity objection has not
received a precise formulation. The situation is as follows: suppose we want to
ground the numerical distinctness of a pair of objects in some form of difference
or discernibility between them. We would not be satisﬁed just to ﬁnd that they
are different in some respect. In addition, we want to ﬁnd that their numerical dis-
tinctness could be grounded in some difference between them, which is not, in
turn, grounded in the fact that they are numerically distinct. The point of the cir-
cularity objection is that grounding in terms of symmetric and irreﬂexive relations
could not do that job. For once we adopt the idiom of grounding, then the fact
that one stands in such relations to another is grounded in their numerical dis-
tinctness, and hence these relations cannot, in turn, ground the fact that the
objects are distinct.
But what does the last claim mean? In our view, there are at least two ways to
spell it out. According to the ﬁrst way, what is objectionable seems to rest on the
thought that a fact cannot be grounded in one of its logical consequences, and
grounding in terms of symmetric and irreﬂexive relations (such as distance
4 We shall apply Ladyman’s thesis in the context of grounding failure, and defend it against what we
call the circularity objection.
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relations) violates this prohibition. For let x and y range over spheres, and
R stand for a distance relation. Since R is irreﬂexive, it logically follows that it
holds between two distinct objects. That is, R is irreﬂexive just in case for any x,
¬Rxx holds, which entails that for any x and y, if Rxy then, by contraposition on
the indiscernibility of identicals, x 6¼ y. Thus, we can say that the numerical dis-
tinctness of the spheres is a logical consequence of the fact that R holds of the
spheres, together with the fact that R is irreﬂexive. So, the above prohibition rules
out grounding Cardinality in terms of Distance.5
Yet this account of what is objectionable about circularity over-reaches,
catching in its net the legitimate grounding of numerical diversity in monadic
properties. Where F is a monadic property, if Fx ^ ¬Fy, then by contraposition
on the indiscernibility of identicals, we have x 6¼ y. But it is very plausible that
the numerical diversity of x and y is grounded in the fact that distinct monadic
properties hold of each of them. Thus, there appears no general prohibition on
grounding a fact in one of its logical consequences, and hence no problematic
circularity has so far been presented for grounding Cardinality in Distance.
(A further reason to reject the general prohibition on grounding facts in their
logical consequences is that facts of the form A ^ B are plausibly grounded in
the fact A and the fact B. But A and B each are logical consequences of
A ^ B.)
The second way of spelling out what is objectionable about circularity lies in
the impredicative use of criteria of identity to ground the numerical diversity of
objects. To illustrate, consider Davidson’s (1969) proposed criterion of identity
for events, which states that for any events x and y, x is identical to y if and only
if x and y have the same causes and same effects:
Dð Þ8x8y Event xð Þ^Event yð Þð Þ! x= yð Þ$8 zð Þ Event zð Þðð
! Cause x,zð Þ$Cause y,zð Þð Þ^ Cause z,xð Þ$Cause z,yð Þð Þð ÞÞÞ:
(D) is impredicative in the sense that what grounds the numerical distinctness
of events is precisely what a criterion of identity for events is supposed to convey.
That is, in order to ground the distinctness of x and y, we must ﬁrst verify
whether they have the same causes and effects. Now, consider a symmetric world
in which x causes y and is caused by y. How can we verify whether x and y are
numerically distinct? The cause of x is y, and the cause of y is x. In this world,
which is structurally similar to Black’s world, we cannot determine whether x and
5 See Shapiro (2008, p. 288, n. 2), where he argues that in order to formulate the claim that R is an
irreﬂexive relation, one needs to “presuppose” non-identity. And this renders the grounding task “trivial
and unilluminating”.
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y have the same cause before we have established whether x is identical to y.6
This provides a second form of pernicious circularity: grounding the numerical
diversity of x and y presupposes their own numerical distinctness.
The important question here is whether the use of impredicative criteria of
identity is permissible or not. This question can best be addressed when we ask
what criteria of identity are for. There are two main understandings of their roles:
epistemological and metaphysical (for more discussion, see Horsten, 2010, sec-
tions 4 and 5). Any criterion of identity speciﬁes the conditions under which a
class of objects are identical or distinct. On the metaphysical construal of criteria
of identity, these conditions tell us what unique “sort”, “kind” or “ontological cat-
egory” the objects under question belong to. For example, the axiom of exten-
sionality in set theory tells us that sets are just those entities which are
individuated in terms of their members. Thus construed, a criterion of identity
associated with a class of objects encodes facts about the nature of those entities.
An important example is the neo-Fregeans’ solution to Frege’s Caesar Problem.
Consider Hume’s Principle (HP) as the criterion of identity for numbers, which
tells us that the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs precisely when
there is a 1–1 correspondence between the Fs and the Gs. In Frege’s view,
although HP determines the conditions under which the number of Fs is the same
as the number of Gs, it fails to determine whether or not the number of Fs is
Julius Caesar. The neo-Fregeans’ solution to this problem is, roughly put, as fol-
lows: HP (and more generally, any admissible criterion of identity) associates a
unique sort or category to numbers (and any other objects, more generally). Thus,
corresponding to each criterion of identity, we have a sort or category such that
any object belonging to that category is individuated in terms of the criterion of
identity, and so anything that is not individuated in terms of 1–1 correspondence
cannot be a number. So persons, including Roman emperors, cannot be numbers
(see Hale and Wright, 2001, ch. 14). Thus seen, a criterion of identity associated
with a class of objects codiﬁes some information about the nature of those
objects.
According to the epistemological construal of criteria of identity, on the other
hand, by specifying the identity-conditions of a given class of objects, a criterion
of identity provides us with a method to individuate the objects under study. On
this view, if it is true that a is identical to b, then there must be a possible situa-
tion in which an agent could either know it to be true or know it to be false. But
it should be explained how the agent’s judgement of identity or distinctness qual-
iﬁes as knowledge. A criterion of identity encodes this sort of explanation. Again,
6 This observation is due to Horsten (2010, pp. 434–6). Although he does not directly discuss the cir-
cularity objection, he provides a framework to spell it out in terms of impredicativity.
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HP is useful here. Suppose that a waiter judges that the number of forks is identi-
cal to the number of knives. The natural explanation of this judgement, in terms
of HP as the criterion of identity for numbers, is that the waiter knows that there
are just as many forks as knives. That is, the fact that the waiter knows that there
are just as many forks as knives explains how he comes to know that the number
of forks is the same as the number of knives.
Now, in light of this picture, we can say that an impredicative criterion of iden-
tity is inadmissible only if it is supposed to play an epistemological role. For if a
criterion of identity is impredicative in the sense illustrated above, then it fails to
explain an agent’s judgement of identity or of distinctness. For example, in the
symmetric world above, we cannot, on the basis of (D), judge whether two puta-
tive events are identical or distinct. If criteria of identity are taken to play an epis-
temological role, that is, if they are supposed to give us a method to provide
knowledge of the identity and distinctness of objects, then they must not be
impredicative. Thus, impredicative criteria of identity are inadmissible only if
they are supposed to undertake an epistemological task.
But things are different if an impredicative criterion of identity is taken to per-
form a metaphysical role. By specifying the identity-conditions for a given class
of objects, a criterion of identity may be used to determine what sort or category
those objects belong to. Again, consider (D), which fails to provide us with a
method to explain our judgements of identity or distinctness. It does tell us, how-
ever, what sort of things events are: it makes plain that events are those entities
whose nature is exhausted by the network of their causes and effects. They are, in
other words, individuated in terms of the causal relations they stand in. Thus, in
so far as we adopt this metaphysical conception of criteria of identity, our inabil-
ity to determine, on the basis of an impredicative criterion, that such purely rela-
tional entities as events are numerically distinct, does not make the criterion
inadmissible or useless.
In sum, there seems to be no objection to using Distance for individuating the
spheres, so long as it could be treated as a metaphysical and not an epistemologi-
cal criterion of identity. So no general objection on the basis of circularity has
been given which prohibits grounding Cardinality in Distance. As such, no
appeal need be made to the controversial ontology of haecceities.
4. Grounding Failure and Referential Indeterminacy
Just as there are ontological options other than haecceitism, so too are there ideo-
logical options other than metaphysical indeterminacy. If grounding failure is to
be explained in terms of indeterminacy, this does not yet commit us to metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy. We suggest that referential indeterminacy, in the sense we
© 2019 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiﬁelsen Theoria
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shall explain below, can also explain grounding failure. As such, it is a rival to
the ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy.
We shall focus on the indeterminacy of singular terms, as opposed to the inde-
terminacy of vague predicates or the so-called borderline cases – for example,
indeterminacy as to whether a given person is in the extension of ‘bald’. We shall
assume that a concrete singular term such as ‘Kilimanjaro’ has many reference-
candidates, each one of which is as good as any other: there are many distinct
entities differing by just one atom, such that each one of them has an equally
good claim to be the referent of ‘Kilimanjaro’. For there are no linguistic, causal,
geographical or sociological features that can pick out one of these entities as the
referent of the word. In this sense, ‘Kilimanjaro’ is a referentially indeterminate
term, for there is a range of entities none of which either determinately is or
determinately is not the referent of ‘Kilimanjaro’: facts about our linguistic usage,
together with all relevant non-semantic background facts fail to narrow down the
reference of our terms to uniqueness. In this sense, we can say that on this
account, both our linguistic usage and “the way the world is” are involved in the
explanation of referential indeterminacy.7
Thus construed, it would be misleading to think of referential indeterminacy as
a purely “semantic” notion. It is more accurate to understand it as a “meta-
semantic” notion, having to do with the relation between terms and assignments
of semantic properties to them. There are, of course, cases in which indetermi-
nacy is purely the result of failure in our semantic conventions. The most obvious
case is “incomplete deﬁnitions”. For example, consider the deﬁnition of
‘dommal’, which is introduced only by the following two sentences:
(1) If x is a dog, then x is a dommal.
(2) If x is a dommal, then x is a mammal.
This deﬁnition is incomplete, in the sense that it does not provide any answer
to a question such as “Is a cat a dommal?”8 The indeterminacy arises purely from
some features of our linguistic conventions. As a result, ‘dommal’ is semantically
indeterminate, simply because (1) and (2) do not say enough to ensure that cats
are dommals. However, the metasemantic conception of indeterminacy does not
arise purely from failures in our linguistic conventions. As said above, both the
way we use language and non-semantic background facts are involved in the
explanation of referential indeterminacy.
7 See McGee and McLaughlin (2000) for more discussion on this reading of Unger’s (1980) problem
of the many as an argument for the referential indeterminacy of terms purporting to refer to concrete
objects.
8 The example is due to Williamson (1994, p. 213).
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While the world is not, on this picture, pictured as being indeterminate, it none-
theless plays an important role in generating indeterminacy. For, in our example,
it fails to co-operate to ensure that there is only one particular object picked out
as the referent of ‘Kilimanjaro’. In this case, the indeterminacy is due to the plu-
rality of equally permissible reference-candidates, which ensures that nothing
determines that by using ‘Kilimanjaro’, only one of them is referred to. We
believe that the same kind of explanation plausibly holds for ‘Castor’ and ‘Pol-
lux’. Black’s universe does not co-operate to ensure that either Castor or Pollux is
the referent of one or other term. In this case, indeterminacy is due to the symme-
try of the world, which ensures that nothing determines that, by using ‘Pollux’,
one sphere is referred to rather than the other.
It is interesting to note that in her recent discussion of metaphysical indetermi-
nacy, Barnes understands the referential indeterminacy of ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’
as a byproduct of metaphysical indeterminacy in Black’s universe. She writes:
[B]ecause nothing grounds the difference between the two spheres, there’s nothing which can
make it the case that “Castor” refers determinately to one sphere and not to the other (and likewise
for “Pollux”) … There’s a sense in which this is referential indeterminacy. But it doesn’t follow
that the indeterminacy is therefore primarily semantic (rather than metaphysical) in origin or expla-
nation. And that’s because it’s referential indeterminacy that arises because of what the world is
like. (Barnes, 2014, p. 354)9
As is plain from our metasemantic understanding of referential indeterminacy, we
agree with Barnes that “what the world is like” is central to the explanation of
indeterminacy in Black’s world. However, we do not think that metaphysical inde-
terminacy best characterizes what the world is like. According to our story, since
Black’s world is symmetric, swapping the spheres results in one and the same
state of affairs. And thus, while there is a sense in which the world does not help
uniquely determine the reference of ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’, the indeterminacy
involved is about the relation between the world and our words, with no implica-
tion about metaphysical indeterminacy.
Referential indeterminacy can comfortably embrace the thesis that grounding
the numerical diversity of Castor and Pollux fails. The fact that there are two
qualitatively identical and yet numerically distinct spheres fails to be grounded in
more fundamental facts. But this does not commit us to anything further than the
metasemantic conception of the referential indeterminacy of ‘Castor’ and ‘Pol-
lux’: there is nothing in our use of ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’ and the conﬁguration of
the universe that can pick out one particular object as the referent of the terms.
9 The thesis that in some cases, referential indeterminacy is induced by metaphysical indeterminacy
has also been defended by Williams (2008).
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It is important, before ending this article, to address the following worry about
the role of stipulations in grounding the numerical diversity of objects. Suppose
we stipulate that:
(L) Let ‘Castor’ refer to one of the spheres, and let ‘Pollux’ refer to the other.
Then, one may say, it is determinately the case that Castor is numerically dis-
tinct from Pollux, even if it is indeterminate which of the spheres ‘Castor’ refers
to. Why is it now no longer problematic that this fact is not grounded? How does
the recognition of referential indeterminacy help us make this seem more
acceptable?10
Before addressing this question, we should point out that stipulations such as
(L) fail to ﬁx reference: in uttering (L), ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’, while appearing as
semantically singular terms that should have a particular object as their referent,
are really akin to variables that may have any object as their value. Thus, by
uttering (L), we are not referring to particular objects, for there is nothing in the
use of the terms (however generous we understand the notion of use here) that
can pick out a particular object as the referent of ‘Castor’, as opposed to that of
‘Pollux’. As a result, on this view, what seems to be a singular term is not a genu-
ine singular term.
It should be noted that this view about the semantics of terms occurring in stip-
ulations such as (L) opposes two proposals in the literature. According to the ﬁrst,
in uttering (L), ‘Castor’ (and also ‘Pollux’) refers to a particular object, but we
cannot know which object it refers to: the reference of the term is ﬁxed arbitrarily.
The other view is that in uttering (L), the terms are neither non-referring expres-
sions, nor are they singular terms which refer only arbitrarily. Rather, they refer
to an arbitrary object: once ‘Castor’ is introduced by (L), it behaves like a seman-
tically singular term in referring to a particular object, albeit the particular object
referred to by ‘Castor’ is a special abstract object, distinct from Castor and Pol-
lux. This arbitrary object is distinguished from Castor and Pollux by its having
all and only those properties that they have in common.11
Now, granted that (L) fails to ﬁx the reference of ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’ to a par-
ticular sphere, we can also see why it fails to ground the numerical diversity of
Castor and Pollux. (L) does not provide us with an effective tool for grounding
their numerical diversity: it only arbitrarily stipulates that they are distinct, and
does not supply any explanation about their distinctness. The analogy with arbi-
trary reference we mentioned above can be useful here: the mere utterance of (L)
fails to ﬁx the reference of the terms involved to a particular sphere, unless we
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for prompting us to think about this question.
11 For the ﬁrst view, see Breckenridge and Magidor (2012), and for the second, see Fine (1983).
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think that reference can be ﬁxed merely arbitrarily; that is, unless we think that
facts about singular reference do not need to be grounded in facts about how we
use singular terms. However, in our view, the claim that reference is primitive is
far from defensible.
To conclude: the several ontological and ideological options discussed here for
explaining cases of grounding failure in fundamental metaphysics render the
dichotomy between haecceitism and metaphysical indeterminacy false and
unmotivated. There are ontological options other than haecceitism for explaining
cases of grounding failure – speciﬁcally, distance relations – and there are also
ideological options other than metaphysical indeterminacy – speciﬁcally, the
metasemantic conception of referential indeterminacy. Logical space is richer than
the dichotomy allows, given these ways of re-describing cases of grounding fail-
ure. Such ways bear further consideration before resorting to the doctrine of
metaphysical indeterminacy.
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